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The purpose of an introduction to any paper is to outline 
its scope and utility. This task is exceptionally important in 
addressing the cosmological aspects of food, because food is 
one of life’s great, sustaining and ubiquitous pleasures, and the 
genre of culinary arts and hospitality education is the vehicle 
for the study these phenomena. I am indebted to Fr. Edwin 
Rabbitte, OFM, for his lectures and his book Cosmology for 
All,  for the inspiration, after a considerable lapse of time, to 
link cosmology and food in the material world. For nearly forty 
years, I’ve been teaching, researching, writing, and talking 
about food, usually with people who disagree with me, about 
‘the meal-experience’, as well as the ‘business’ of operating 
successful restaurants. I have come upon the cosmological 
aspects of food only very recently. 
Cosmology is understood as the philosophy of matter. 
Chemistry and physics are the sciences that deal with matter. 
To many people in the culinary arts field ‘science’ and ‘philos-
ophy’ are mysteries, barriers to learning, and an inhibiting 
authority rather than a facilitator of the means and methods 
for learning. 
Today, there is a general tendency to believe that all truth 
worth knowing about matter is to be found in the various 
branches of the physical sciences. If this were so, there could 
be no place for a philosophy of matter, or by extension the 
cosmological aspects of food. This paper should end here. 
The reason it does not is because of my most recent reading 
of KC Chang’s (ed.) (1977) Food in Chinese culture; anthro-
pology and historical perspectives. Therein, I came across a 
section heading in the chapter by EN Anderson Jr and Maria 
Anderson titled The cosmological aspects (376) which in 
turn drove me to research this phenomenon – cosmology. 
‘Cosmology’, according to Rabbitte (1956), in his little book 
Cosmology for all, ‘is understood as the philosophy of matter’. 
Anthropologists tell us that in virtually all traditional cultures, 
a cosmology is what gives its members their fundamental 
sense of where they come from, who they are, and what their 
personal role in life’s larger picture might be. Cosmology is 
whatever picture of the universe a culture agrees on. Together 
with the picture-upholding, the picture-is, a story that is 
understood to explain the sacred relationship between the 
way the world is and the way human beings should behave. 
Other cultures’ stories may not have been ‘correct’ by modern 
scientific standards, but they were valid, for and in, their own 
time and by their own standards, and they had the power to 
ground people’s codes of behaviour and their sense of identity 
within a larger picture. This sense of identity may be part of 
what has been lost in our contemporary society. 
For example, if we were to ask a modern audience of people 
interested in cosmology, but untrained in it, to close their eyes 
and visualise the universe, some will report seeing endless 
space with stars scattered unimaginably far apart, others will 
see great spiral galaxies, and others will see an exotic scene 
such as the rising of an ember-red moon over an unknown 
planet. They do not realise that these are merely snapshots 
on a given scale of the universe – no more representative of 
the universe as a whole than is a single molecule of DNA or 
a moonrise over your own backyard. The strange fact is that 
in modern Western culture, people have only the vaguest 
idea how to picture the universe, and certainly there is no 
consensus on it.
The lack of social consensus on cosmology in the modern 
world has caused many people to close off their thinking to the 
larger issues, and long time scales, so that small, immediate 
matters dominate their consciousness. Of course, modern 
people know much more about many things than members 
of isolated, traditional cultures, but we are not so different in 
our basic needs from people millennia ago. We have to get 
our sense of context somewhere. It is worth looking at earlier 
cosmologies and the cultures in which they held sway in order 
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to understand how deep and in fact how inextricable the 
connection is.
The thing is that food and culinary arts sit as a lesser genre 
in the education firmament to philosophy,  sciences, the arts, 
literature and human drama. 
This has always astonished me, as culinary arts and 
gastronomy affect all of us, everyday, and indeed several times 
a day, for all of our lives. Today, the fact that food is a vital part 
of the chemical process of life is to state the obvious, but we 
frequently fail to realise and acknowledge that food is much 
more than vital to human existence (Hegarty, 2014).
So why is this field of endeavour not – the most sought 
after? After all food was once all that concerned us humans. 
That makes food the most important material in the world. 
I believe that the utilitarian aspects of food and cooking 
being ‘necessary’ for survival may have inhibited the academic 
study of culinary arts and gastronomy. For their survival needs, 
all men and women everywhere would eat the same foods, to 
be measured only in calories, fats, carbohydrates, proteins, and 
vitamins. But clearly this is not the case – people of different 
backgrounds and ethnologies eat very differently. Thus is the 
importance of culinary arts and gastronomy established.
Food is agriculture, horticulture, biology, psychology, 
transport, human connection, animal connection, waste, 
health, medicine, nurture, nature, science, and also 
gastronomy – ‘all that pertains to the nourishment of man’ 
(Brillat Savarin).
Indeed Lévi-Strauss (1965) observes that just as there is no 
human society which lacks a spoken language, so also, there is 
no human society which does not in one way or other process 
some of its food by cooking. Therefore, cooking is a means 
by which nature is transformed into culture. Edmund Leach 
emphasises this point by stating; 
In that we are all men (women) we are all part of 
nature, in that we are all human beings we are all part 
of culture. Our survival as men (women) depends on 
our ingestion of foods (part of nature); Our survival as 
human beings depends on our social categories which 
are derived from cultural classification imposed on 
elements of nature... 
Food is an especially appropriate mediator because 
when we eat, we establish in a literal sense, a direct 
identity between ourselves (culture/civilisation) and our 
food (nature).
Along the road to civilisation and technological prowess we 
humans appear to have lost our imagination, but not totally, 
and not all of us, but most of us. And as we live in the equiva-
lent of a large termite nest, only with wifi, and Nintendo, 
most of us hold sway. That is worrying because I’ve come to 
the conclusion that the sway-holding most of us are not that 
imaginative, or at least not when it comes to creative, intellec-
tual thought.
The lack of social consensus on the cosmology of food in 
the modern world has caused many people to close off their 
thinking to large issues and long time scales, so that small 
immediate matters dominate their consciousness. We have 
to get our sense of context somewhere. It is worth looking at 
earlier cosmologies and the cultures in which they held sway 
in order to understand how deep and in fact inextricable the 
connection is.
Cosmology a ‘special metaphysics’
Cosmology comes from the Greek word kosmos which, 
according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary means ‘the 
world or universe as an ordered system’ or ‘order, harmony, 
a harmonious system’. Cosmology then, means the theory 
of the universe as an ordered whole, and of the general laws 
which govern it. In philosophy, it is taken to mean that part 
of metaphysics which deals with the idea of the world as a 
totality of all phenomena in space and time. According to 
Greek thought, cosmos came out of chaos – ‘the formless 
void: a state of utter confusion and disorder’ – by differen-
tiating the various elements. The concept is often associated 
with cosmogony, ‘a theory, system, or account of the genera-
tion of the universe’.
In social anthropology, the meaning of cosmology has 
broadly followed the dictionary one, and is closely connected 
to the empirical study of religions. To a large extent the two 
words have been used interchangeably, depending upon 
theoretical fashions and the predilections of the anthro-
pologist. Some have used it to mean no more than religion. 
Edmund Leach (1982, 229), for example, defined it as ‘the 
system of beliefs and practices which social anthropologists 
commonly refer to as primitive religion’.
Philosophy is the metaphysical study of reality, that is, the 
study of reality from the point of view of ‘being’. It is divided 
into ‘general metaphysics’ which studies ‘being’ in general 
and its essential properties, and ‘special metaphysics’, which 
studies the different classes or ‘modes’ of being considered 
separately. Special metaphysics comprises two main branches: 
‘rational psychology’, or the metaphysical study of the organic 
or living world, and ‘cosmology’ or the metaphysical study of 
the inorganic or purely material world.
Cosmology then is a branch of metaphysics – more precisely, 
of ‘special’ metaphysics. To understand, therefore, the nature 
and scope of cosmology, it is necessary to know something 
about the relation that exists between ‘general’ and ‘special’ 
metaphysics. 
Seen from its source, metaphysics may be described 
as an effort of the human mind to attain by reflection to a 
knowledge of the intimate nature and ultimate signification of 
things, especially of man himself. This effort is rooted in the 
most profound structure of man’s nature; it is truly ‘existential’, 
since it springs from the nature of man’s existence as man. For 
man, in the consciousness he has of himself experiences his 
existence as an existence that is called upon to realise itself as 
a ‘liberty’, or person. Hence it is that the questions inevitably 
arise: what is man? And what is the meaning of his existence? 
As long as man cannot answer this question, he cannot realise 
himself as a ‘liberty’, for liberty in its deepest sense is precisely 
the power that man has to accept consciously the meaning 
of his existence as man, and to conform his activity to this 
meaning. Thus, there is a close link between metaphysical 
reflection and human liberty; this is why the metaphysical 
question becomes most acute in those situations in which man 
is brought face-to-face with the meaning of his existence as a 
free person – e.g.  in times of moral crisis, or at the moment 
of death, when the obligatory character of certain acts, or 
the meaning of life itself as a whole is questioned. Though 
it has its origin in a peculiarly human problem, however, 
metaphysical reflection bears from the very first, and always, 
on existence or being as a totality – it transcends every partial 
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view of the real. The reason for this is the profound ontological 
similitude which binds all existents together and which causes 
man himself to experience his existence as an existence-in-
the-world. Thus, the study of the intimate nature and ultimate 
meaning of human existence is inseparable from the study of 
the contents, structure and meaning of existence as a whole. 
However, precisely because metaphysics is a peculiarly human 
problem, metaphysical reflection is necessarily conditioned 
by the ‘situation’ of man in the world, i.e., by the finitude or 
limitations characteristic of man. For example, it is believed 
that humans have been using fire for hundreds of thousands 
of years, yet archaeology does not tell us exactly when our 
ancestors began to do so. The inability of the archaeological 
evidence to tell us when humans first controlled fire directs 
us to biology, where we find two vital clues. First, the fossil 
record presents a reasonably clear picture of the changes in 
human anatomy over the past two million years (Wrangham, 
2009). Now in the first place human thought is not a creative 
thought. Man is the source neither of himself nor of the world: 
he experiences his existence as a ‘fact’ as something ‘given’, 
and this existence is an existence in a world that is also a ‘fact’, 
that is ‘already there’ or is ‘given’. For this reason metaphys-
ical reflection must start with and nourish itself continually on 
‘experience’, that is, contact with the real.  And, in the second 
place, this experience itself, being essentially a human experi-
ence is profoundly limited: it is never the experience of the real 
as a totality, of being as such, but always experience, partial 
and progressive, of ‘individual’ or ‘particular’ beings.
To conclude, we can now state the relation that exists 
between general metaphysics, or the study of being as such, 
and special metaphysics, or the study of particular beings 
considered separately. On the one hand we cannot study the 
structure and meaning of being in general or as a totality, 
except in the measure that this being is manifested in the 
particular beings of our experience; and, on the other hand, 
we cannot study the structure and meaning of particular 
beings except in the light of the totality of being in which these 
beings participate. Hence, general and special metaphysics 
are closely akin: both are animated by the same intention (to 
discover the meaning of being or reality), and both have the 
same starting point (the concrete, individual beings of experi-
ence), but whereas general metaphysics aims at discovering 
the meaning of being as a totality, special metaphysics seeks to 
discover the basic structure or essence and the ultimate signifi-
cation of particular beings – of living beings (psychology) or of 
the material world (cosmology).
Nature, scope and method of cosmology
Cosmology therefore, as a branch of philosophy, is the 
metaphysical study of the material world. Its aim is to 
discover, by an effort of reflection, the manner of being or the 
‘essence’ of this world and its signification and place in the 
totality of the real. This reflection, like all metaphysical reflec-
tion, must be based on experience, or contact with the real; 
hence cosmology presupposes that our intellect is capable of 
entering into contact with the mode of being that is proper 
to the material world. This contact is made in our everyday 
life of sensation, in scientific experiment, and in our action, in 
general, on the material world.
Note that scientific experience is included as pertaining 
to the experimental basis of cosmology. It would be naive 
to think that the ‘familiar’ world of everyday experience is 
more ‘objective’ than that of science, and that therefore 
it is sufficient to analyse the data of ‘common-sense’ to 
construct a cosmology. This does not mean, however, that 
our common-sense knowledge of the material world is false, 
but that it is confused. Its greatest fault, from the point of 
view of cosmology, is that it does not so much tell us what 
the material world is in itself as how we react to or behave 
in that world. For it must be remembered that the function 
of sense-knowledge as such is primarily biological: its chief 
purpose is to enable us to live our lives in the material world, 
not to know that world exhaustively. Science, however, aims at 
a much more objective and more comprehensive knowledge 
of the material world: it seeks to discover what the world is in 
itself, rather than how we see and behave in it. Hence the use 
it makes of objective measuring-processes, by which it endeav-
ours both to eliminate the subjective element introduced 
into reality by the knowing subject and to reach to those 
aspects of the material world that are inaccessible to sense-
knowledge. It may be objected that such a method can, in the 
final analysis, attain only to the metrical aspect of the material 
world. We shall have occasion to return to this later, but it may 
be remarked here that the aspect of the world discovered by 
science is at least more objective and more comprehensive 
than that discovered by sense-knowledge alone, and that it 
therefore enables us to form a more objective and ever richer 
idea of the material universe.
The outline followed in this paper is as follows. In the first 
section we describe, as concisely as possible, what science is 
and what it does, in order to show the distinction between the 
scientific and the philosophical approach to the material world. 
In later sections we give what may be called a ‘phenomeno-
logical description’ of the material world, i.e., a description 
of it – its characteristic properties, its diversity, and its activity 
– such as it manifests itself to the intellectual consciousness 
in everyday experience and in the more technical experience 
of science. Finally, we endeavour by an effort of metaphys-
ical reflection based in this description to discover all we can 
concerning the mode of being or ‘essence’ of the material 
world and its signification or place in reality as a whole. 
The world of physical science
The same material world which forms the subject matter of 
cosmology is studied also, by the various branches of natural 
or experimental science. The ‘natural sciences’ are those 
which deal with the phenomena of the material universe. 
They are called ‘experimental’ both because they are based on 
sensible experience and also and especially because they refer 
constantly to this experience as the sole criterion of the validity 
of their conclusions. The natural sciences comprise the physico-
chemical sciences, which treat of phenomena of inorganic 
nature, and the biological sciences which treat of phenomena 
of organic or living nature. Hence the importance, both for 
the philosopher and for the scientist, of distinguishing clearly 
between the problems proper to each of these two divisions 
of human knowledge. In the introduction we described the 
nature scope and method of cosmology. We shall now perform 
a similar task for sciences, but only in so far as is necessary 
to determine the precise import of its statements about the 
material world and to show that these statements leave the 
ultimate or philosophical problems untouched.
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Our enquiry may be summarised as follows; the 
fundamental aim of science is the reduction of the sequence 
of natural occurrences to order, with a view to the calcula-
tion and prediction, and ultimately to the control, of the 
phenomena of nature. As a system of knowledge science is 
characterised chiefly by the method by which it collects its 
data (scientific ‘facts’), and by the manner in which it synthesis 
and explains these data (scientific ‘laws’ and ‘theories’). Thus 
science is constructed not merely by observation and experi-
ment, but also by reflection on the data thus acquired. In 
all cases, however, the conclusions of science must admit 
of experimental verification; this is the very touchstone of 
scientific truth. However, reference needs to be made here 
to what have become known as the research paradigm wars, 
a description of research methods of contrasting persua-
sions, which have become known as Positivistism/scientific 
and post-positivism – the basis of the natural sciences. It 
presents a quantitative perspective (Pawson 1999, 30, Kane 
and O’Reilly-de Brun 2001, 24–43). Phenomenology, another 
paradigm presents a qualitative perspective. A third paradigm 
is critical theory which holds that there is an objective world 
which the observer can stand apart from and investigate. But 
whose world is it? Is it the world of the philosopher, the chef, 
the restaurant owner, the customer, the food writer, or the 
culinary educator?  
Academic elites have had charge of the research agenda, 
setting the questions, funding the research and interpreting 
the results. This challenges the purpose of research which 
aims to empower people to set their own action agendas. 
The term “paradigm” was introduced into the literature by 
Kuhn (1970, 175–182) who intended to convey the idea that 
research gets organised not just through rational adoption of 
particular strategies and methodologies, but rather, that all the 
contributory ideas get wrapped up into an overall “vision”, or 
“creed” or “doctrine” about the correct way to do research. 
Thus, methodology, Kuhn points out, can itself become a 
kind of dogmatism which includes identifying good practice, 
and thereby excludes, by vilifying alternative approaches as 
misguided, wrong-headed, dim-witted and so on. 
Each of these schools of thought pays homage to a 
contrasting set of first principles, and over the last forty years 
the extent to which the qualitative revolution has overtaken 
the social sciences and related professional fields is most 
striking (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, ix). Prior to that, the general 
approach to research was positivist, (hard science)  that is, 
it placed an emphasis on numbers and statistics, experi-
mental design, and survey research. The aim of the positivist 
researcher is to seek generalisations and ‘hard’ quantita-
tive data.  The influence of the positivist scientist paradigm 
continues to be strong and pervasive shaping expectations of 
what constitutes ‘proper’, ‘valid’, and ‘worthwhile’ research. 
Barry Troyna described it thus in 1994:
There is a view which is already entrenched and circulating 
widely in populist circles ..., that qualitative research is subjec-
tive, value-laden and therefore, unscientific and invalid, in 
contrast to quantitative research, which meets the criteria of 
being objective, value free, scientific and therefore valid (1994, 
9).
The social sciences originally adopted the methodologies 
of the physical sciences. Today, researchers in many fields 
including culinary have opened up to ethnomethodology, 
unstructured interviewing, conversational and textual analysis, 
documents and historical studies and many other theoretical 
paradigms of research. The interpretative researcher accepts 
that the observer makes a difference to the observed and that 
reality is a human construct – the researcher’s aim is to explore 
perspectives and shared meanings and to develop insights 
into situations, e.g., restaurants, kitchens. Data will generally 
be qualitative and based on fieldwork, notes, transcripts of 
conversations/interviews. 
For this and the following sections (see Renoirte, transl. 
Coffey 1950, 101–174, also Rabbitte 1955, 17–34). The first 
step in research is the collection of data. This science does by a 
method which is peculiarly its own and which, in the scientists’ 
view, endows scientific knowledge with qualities which make 
it superior to everyday sense knowledge. These qualities are 
objectivity, communicability, and verifiability.
A critical examination of our everyday sense knowledge 
shows that it is always, to a greater or lesser extent personal 
and subjective. Sensation is a complex reaction of the knowing 
subject to the action of external objects on his sense-organs. 
In this reaction it is impossible to separate what comes from 
the knowing subject and what from the external object; there 
is always something of the knowing subject in sensation – a 
subject, for example, with different senses than mine would 
perceive the external world differently. Hence it is that sense-
knowledge, as such, is incommunicable and unverifiable by 
others, for, since it is impossible to compare the lived impres-
sions of different subjects, it is strictly impossible to know if 
different subjects have the same sensation when confronted 
with the same material object, and so we cannot ever be 
absolutely certain that the words each uses to describe these 
objects have the same meaning for all. For example, many 
books contain maps of the tongue that claim that the tip 
recognises sweet and so on. To witness that all tongues are 
different, all you have to do is ask a group of individuals to 
stick their tongues into sweet or salty water, and record the 
results (This 2009, 7).
Now science claims that its knowledge, unlike sense-
knowledge, is impersonal and objective, and hence communi-
cable and verifiable by all. It bases this claim on the fact that 
it has, by its method, ‘depersonalised’ sense-knowledge and 
made it strictly objective by excluding from it as far as possible, 
the influences of the psychological dispositions personal 
to the knowing subject. Science has done this in effect by 
substituting strictly material processes for our sense-organs, 
and scale or pointer readings for our sense-impressions. For 
example, for everyday, uncritical knowledge the heat of a body 
is defined by the particular sensation I get when I touch it. This 
sensation is strictly personal to me; no one can ever verify it, 
for no one but myself knows what I sense when I feel warm. 
Clearly, this knowledge tells me much more about myself than 
about the external world; when I say for example, that a body 
is ‘hot’, what I really mean is, that it is such that, when I touch 
it, I get a sensation which I call ‘heat’. The scientist on the 
other hand, defines the heat of a body by the pointer reading 
on a thermometer which he places in contact with that body. 
The observation of this reading is wholly independent of the 
scientist’s own sensation of heat: whether the body ‘feels’ 
hot or not is of no interest to the scientist; he speaks only of 
the pointer reading given by the thermometer and not of his 
personal sensation of heat. Hence it is that his knowledge is 
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impersonal and so communicable and verifiable, for no matter 
what may be the sensation experienced by the scientist who, 
on touching a body says it is hot, all know the meaning of and 
can verify his statement that the heat of a body is so many 
degrees of temperature. Examples of the differences between 
common-sense and scientific knowledge or data could be 
multiplied indefinitely, and especially in the field of culinary and 
gastronomy. Such common-sense data as the sound, weight, 
colour, etc., of bodies are defined by the different sensations 
contact with these bodies provoke in us in different domains 
of perception, on the basis of which we attribute to them 
qualities or properties of different kinds or at least different 
intensities. The scientist, however, having established that 
certain material instruments give different pointer readings 
when suitably arranged in relation to the bodies in question, 
and that these different readings are concomitant with the 
variations of sensations of a different type, elects to redefine 
the properties, hitherto defined by sensations, by the use of 
appropriate instruments. And so he defines sound by the 
vibrations recorded on a phonograph, weight by the elonga-
tion of a spring-balance, colour by the angle of refraction of 
light in a prism....
The method, therefore, by which science collects and 
defines its data or “facts” is the utilisation of suitable material 
instruments. Scientific properties are defined by the measuring 
process by which they are known; hence any body which can 
be subjected to the appropriate measuring process possesses 
the physical property which this process defines. Again, since 
different bodies are defined in terms of their properties (for 
we say ‘what kind’ a body is by enumerating its properties) 
it follows that, for science bodies are defined in terms of 
the numbers given by the pointer reading of the measuring-
process to which the bodies in question can be subjected. For 
example science defines hydrogen as a gas which liquifies at 
such a temperature, has such a density, emits such a light etc. 
this definition simply means that the name hydrogen is given to 
that particular thing which, when subjected to the measuring 
processes defining fluidity, temperature, viscosity, wavelength 
of light etc., gives the numbers indicated in the definition. This 
does not mean, of course, that a body is merely an aggregate 
of numbers, but that it is ‘something’  which science, for its 
own purposes defines by property measurements.
Science and philosophy
Among science’s claims, is its claim to be an exact observa-
tional and experimental investigation of nature – its methods, 
it states, is exclusively observation and experiment. Hence, the 
self-imposed limitations of science as a form of knowledge 
are, first, that its explanations can never be complete explana-
tions, for they can be valid only for a partial or abstract aspect 
of reality, viz., that aspect that can be, directly or indirectly, 
observed and measured, and secondly, that its explana-
tions can never be ultimate explanations, since, by the very 
nature of its method, science begins and ends with a sensible 
‘given’ which it regards as outside the domain of scientific 
intelligibility.
The second of these limitations requires, perhaps, some 
explanation. Science begins by assuming the existence of an 
external world which has different properties (which science 
defines by the use of different measuring-processes) and which 
is constantly changing (changes which science formulates as 
laws). If this ‘given’ science endeavours to give a complete 
mechanical explanation – i.e. science accepts mechanism as 
a working hypothesis, and as the only working hypothesis. In 
other words, science endeavours to explain the actual diversity 
and change of the material world in terms of elements (waves, 
particles etc.,) that are imagined to an existence of the same 
kind as that possessed by the objects if sense-perception. It 
does not matter that these elements are for the most part 
inaccessible to sense-perception – they are always thought of 
as having properties the same in nature as those possessed by 
perceptible bodies. Thus science takes the sensible order not 
only as the starting point, but as the goal of its inferences. 
In this sense scientific explanation is essentially descriptive – it 
answers the questions ‘how’? Rather than the question ‘why’? 
Hence it is that all scientific explanations lead in the end to 
a question or hypothesis and that no matter how far science 
progresses there will always be another question to ask..
Philosophy on the other hand claims to study the integral 
real – not merely the ‘here and now’ of everyday sensible 
experience, still less merely ‘concrete facts’ of positive science, 
but the real in all its richness and concreteness. The method 
to which it appeals is not therefore experiences only, either 
sensible or scientific, but metaphysical reflection on global 
experience. In this way philosophy claims to attain to ultimate 
causes and so to offer complete explanations. Thus, the scope 
of philosophy is all-embracing, extending to – and beyond – 
the existence of the science itself, for one of the questions 
the philosopher must ask himself is how and why nature is 
amenable to scientific formulation. We may conclude this 
paper with a word of caution. It should be clear from what 
has been said that cosmology cannot under any circumstances 
be taken as a substitute for the experimental study of nature 
carried out by science. As a branch of metaphysics, the aim of 
which is to interpret nature, cosmology is incapable of adding 
a single ‘fact’ to the sum of ascertained ‘facts’ about the 
universe. The suspicion with which cosmology was for so long 
viewed by positive science was, in the beginning at least, due 
to the fact that cosmology, in the form of Aristotelian ‘physics’, 
claimed that the experimental investigation of facts of nature 
also belonged to its domain – i.e. the ‘philosophy’ of nature 
was also the ‘science’ of nature. In the present day this claim 
is no longer made, but the danger now is that cosmology may 
be regarded as valueless, precisely because it is incapable of 
adding to our store of facts about nature – in other words, 
the danger is now that the ‘science’ of nature may also be 
regarded as the ‘philosophy’ of nature. But cosmology, as a 
branch of philosophy, is not concerned with the accumula-
tion of facts but with the interpretation of certain previously 
ascertained facts. These facts are discovered by experi-
ence of the material world, an experience which includes 
scientific experience, hence it is that the cosmologist must use 
the conclusions of experimental science, not with a view to 
incorporating them as such into philosophy, but as a means 
of acquiring an ever richer and more objective knowledge of 
material reality. Indeed a philosophy worthy of the name must 
take account of all the general conclusions of science in regard 
to the nature and genesis of the inorganic, the organic, and 
the human, though it must always critically examine these 
conclusions in order to determine their value for interpretation 
of the essence and ultimate meaning of the real.
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The aim of cosmology then is to discover not merely the 
profound nature or essence, but also, the ultimate signification 
or meaning of material being, i.e. the place or function of this 
being in the totality of the real. For, as we saw in the introduc-
tion, metaphysics transcends all partial aspects: it bears from 
the first and always on being as a totality. And in particular 
beings only as pertaining to that totality.
When we consider the universe as a whole, we find that 
this whole is a complex whole, comprising many different 
levels and structures from inorganic matter up to and including 
man. From the metaphysical point of view these structures 
form a hierarchy of perfection or ‘degrees’ of being, based on 
an order of increasing ‘interiority’ or individuality. The most 
elementary structure of reality is that of inorganic matter; 
this, as a spatio-temporal exteriority or dispersion, constitutes, 
metaphysically speaking, the lowest level of perfection in the 
visible universe. Above the level of inorganic matter are the 
various levels or ‘degrees’ of life. Now life on whatever level 
it be considered, manifests itself as a real and active synthesis, 
i.e. the reduction of a diversity to a unity. The lowest level of 
life – vegetative life – utilises inorganic matter, and reduces 
reduces the diversity of this matter to the unity of an organism. 
The next level of life – sensory or animal life – utilises in its 
turn vegetative life: sensory life can take place only in and 
by the organism, and the properties of sensory life presup-
pose and include those of vegetative life. Here the synthesis 
or the reduction of diversity to unity is much greater than the 
vegetative life, for in sensory life the quantitative diversity of 
the organism is unified in qualitatively simple sensation. And 
finally, the highest level of life known to us in nature – the 
intellectual, volitional or spiritual life of man – presupposes 
and utilises a very highly developed form of sensory life. Here 
the reduction of diversity to unity reaches its maximum, for 
in human life the sense-knowledge and sense-affections of 
purely animal life are transcendently unified in the ideas and 
values of the higher spiritual self. In many of the folk religions 
of the ancient world there is no clear distinction between the 
sacred and the secular, or between this world and the other 
world; there is simply one universe. And it is natural that food 
should be viewed as a critical part of the most demanding 
and difficult communication of all – communication with 
the invisible portion of the world. Another paper would 
be required to engage with the topic of the use of food in 
religious practice.
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